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CamCOPS is a free, open-source client–server system for secure data capture in
the domain of psychiatry, psychology, and the clinical neurosciences. The client is a
cross-platform C++ application, suitable for mobile and offline (disconnected) use.
It allows touchscreen data entry by subjects/patients, researchers/clinicians, or both
together. It implements a large and extensible range of tasks, from simple questionnaires
to complex animated tasks. The client uses encrypted data storage and sends data via
an encrypted network connection to a CamCOPS server. Individual institutional users
set up and run their own CamCOPS server, so no data is transferred outside the
hosting institution’s control. The server, written in Python, provides clinically oriented and
research-oriented views of tasks, including the tracking of changes over time. It provides
an audit trail, export facilities (such as to an institution’s primary electronic health record
system), and full structured data access subject to authorization. A single CamCOPS
server can support multiple research/clinical groups, each having its own identity policy
(e.g., fully identifiable for clinical use; de-identified/pseudonymised for research use).
Intellectual property rules regarding third-party tasks vary and CamCOPS has several
mechanisms to support compliance, including for tasks that may be permitted to some
institutions but not others. CamCOPS supports task scheduling and home testing via a
simplified user interface. We describe the software, report local information governance
approvals within part of the UK National Health Service, and describe illustrative clinical
and research uses.
Keywords: clinical informatics, research data capture, cognitive assessment, psychology, psychiatry, clinical
neurosciences, information governance
INTRODUCTION
There are strong potential advantages to the electronic capture of information relevant to
cognitive and psychiatric assessment. Measurement-based care improves clinical outcomes (1).
Some simple standardized scales are in widespread clinical use, such as for affective disorders
or cognitive examination [e.g., (2, 3)], but if the information is captured using pen and
paper then its subsequent clinical accessibility and/or availability for research is limited, and
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tasks must be scored by hand, taking time and introducing
the potential for error. More complex computerized tasks
are being translated from research to clinical use [e.g., (4)],
but the clinical application of such animated tasks can be
limited by practical considerations such as availability. Clinical
and research assessments involve the documentation of a
considerable quantity of information. Whether in a research
or a clinical environment, and whether in an environment
using paper-based or electronic health records (EHRs), there
are incentives to capture such information electronically and in
a standardized and structured fashion (5, 6). These incentives
include a potential reduction in the effort of data capture; the
ability to reproduce information accurately, legibly, and fast; the
ability to appreciate trends over time; and the ability to analyse
data for research or administrative purposes later. Information
entered directly by patients can be used for screening and other
purposes [e.g., (7)]. Rapid electronic systems can also capture
information on outcomes that may not otherwise be measured
routinely, such as quality of life indicators, used as the basis of
many health economic measurements (8).
However, software for this purpose must overcome several
potential pitfalls. First, for an application to enter widespread
clinical use, it should save clinicians time, or at least place
minimal time burden on clinicians. It should be quick to
use and available at the bedside, in the clinic, or wherever a
clinical or research encounter may take place. Second, users
or institutions may be deterred from using software that is
proprietary or closed-source (9–12), expensive, or that comes
with practical restrictions on the use of raw data. Third, data
capture systems are easy to write but harder to secure. There
are considerable information security problems that would
prohibit many simple applications from being used within a
secure environment, as in a clinical context. For example,
applications are likely to fall foul of UK National Health Service
(NHS) information governance principles if they allow one
patient to see another’s data; transmit patient-identifiable data
(PID) over an insecure e-mail network or via an unencrypted
network link; use inappropriate cryptographic algorithms; fail to
prevent unencrypted PID being backed up automatically from a
tablet to commercial “cloud” storage; or use servers hosted on
insecure or third-party computers, including those in prohibited
jurisdictions (13–18).
We describe a novel client–server software package,
the Cambridge Cognitive and Psychiatric Assessment Kit
(CamCOPS), which attempts to address these problems. It
incorporates a number of common and freely available tasks, and
can serve as a basis for the addition of further arbitrary tasks in
the future. It is an open-source cross-platform system that uses
touchscreen tablet devices or desktop/laptop computers for data
capture. Instances of the client application (“app”) send their
information securely to a central server, owned and controlled
by the operating institution. The server provides a “front end”
for convenient use by clinicians and researchers, with additional
“back-end” facilities to support subsequent research analysis
and system interoperability. CamCOPS offers many well-known
questionnaires and some more advanced (e.g., animated)
tests relevant to cognitive and psychiatric assessment, plus
structured and unstructured clinical record-keeping facilities.
Data capture can be performed with the app offline, so the
system can be used in places with no network reception, such as
on domiciliary visits or in unusual radiofrequency environments.
The system is compatible with UK NHS information security
standards, though compliance with those standards requires
other institutional practices as well. As the system is free
and open source, we suggest it is suitable for others to use
and extend.
DESIGN AND FACILITIES FROM A USER’S
PERSPECTIVE
Client–Server Architecture
Data collection and storage is organized around a client–server
model (Figure 1). Tablet devices or desktop/laptop computers
running the CamCOPS app act as one type of client. A
clinician/researcher, a patient/subject, or both together can
interact with the device to capture information. Upon request,
the app then sends these data securely to the server, located
within the host institution. The other main type of client is a
clinician/researcher using a web browser or other interface to
retrieve information from the server. Strict controls, described
below, govern the exchange of data between clients and
the server.
Subject Identification
The software system is designed to cope with clinical
environments that use fully identifiable patient information, and
with research environments in which participants are assigned a
pseudonym or code and an individual’s identity is not obtainable
without additional information (the pseudonym-to-identity
mapping) stored securely elsewhere. The flexibility to operate in
both these environments is achieved by defining the meaning
of multiple identification (ID) numbers and specifying the
minimum and/or maximum information permitted.
The system defines the following subject identity fields, not
all of which need to be used: forename, surname, date of birth,
sex/gender (M/F/X) (19), and an arbitrary number of ID number
types (e.g., national ID number, hospital ID number, study ID
number), plus optional address, e-mail, general practitioner, and
“other” details for convenience. The administrator defines the
meaning of each of the ID number types. CamCOPS supports
data verification for some specific ID number types, such as NHS
numbers, which incorporate a checksum.
CamCOPS supports two types of ID policy: an upload policy
and a finalizing policy. The upload policy defines the identity
information required for the client app to send data to the server.
The finalizing policy defines the identity information required for
the app to move data to the server, allowing erasure from the
client device (with permanent storage on the server). This two-
stage process allows data to be entered for new subjects before
that subject is registered on a host institution’s systems. Two
examples may serve to clarify.
In a research environment using pseudonyms, the
administrator might define the meaning of “ID number type
1” to be “Research ID.” The upload policy might be “sex AND
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of the CamCOPS data capture system. (A) Data capture to the mobile app. (B) Subsequent data flow from the mobile device to the institution’s
CamCOPS server, and thence to individuals viewing or analysing the data, and/or electronic and (if required) paper clinical records.
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idnum1”. The finalizing policy might be identical. Therefore, the
system would accept uploads only if the researcher had entered a
subject’s sex/gender and research ID number (as defined by the
institution or individual research study concerned), but would
not require any other information. Indeed, other information
might be prohibited, such as “sex AND idnum1 AND NOT
(forename OR surname OR dob)”.
In a complex clinical environment using fully identifiable
records, such as a mental health Trust that operates its own
patient numbering scheme but also provides urgent on-call
services to several hospitals in its region, the administrator might
define “idnum1” to mean “Hospital A number,” “idnum2” to
mean “Hospital B number,” “idnum3” to mean “NHS number,”
and so on. Suppose Hospital A is the provider institution. The
upload policymight be “forenameAND surnameANDdobAND
sex AND (idnum1 OR idnum2 OR idnum3)”, and the finalizing
policy might be “forename AND surname AND dob AND sex
AND idnum1”. This would mean a clinician could enter patient
details in Hospital B, using Hospital B’s number, without yet
knowing the number used by their core institution (Hospital A).
The system would require a full name, date of birth, sex/gender,
and at least one ID number. At that early stage, the clinician could
upload the data, and store a properly identified electronic copy in
Hospital B’s electronic or paper records. On return to their base
in Hospital A, the clinician could look up the patient’s number
in Hospital A’s system or register a new patient, and complete
the record by filling in the Hospital A number (idnum1). At this
point the software would allow the record to be re-uploaded and
deleted from the tablet.
Using the CamCOPS Client Application to
Capture Data
The starting point of the client app is shown in Figure 2.
To capture data, the clinician/researcher usually begins by
selecting a subject, recording the subject’s details according to
the identification policies in place. The operator then selects a
task and creates a new task instance [current available tasks are
listed at (20)]. The task will then run. Typical tasks appear as
single-page or multiple-page questionnaires, or animated tasks
(Figure 3). They range from very simple tasks, such as the Patient
Health Questionnaire-9 [PHQ-9; (2)], through tasks with more
complex logic, such as the Clinical Interview Schedule—Revised
[CISR; (21, 22)], and those with a more complex interface,
such as the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination—III [ACE-
III; (3)], to complex animated tasks such as a three-dimensional
intradimensional/extradimensional set-shifting task (23).
Questionnaire-style tasks have a consistent user interface,
indicating mandatory/optional data items and permitting
progression when mandatory information has been provided.
The questionnaire user interface is consistent across platforms
(operating systems, OSs). User customization of the interface is
limited but includes font sizing for accessibility and language
selection (discussed further below).
Some tasks are intrinsically anonymous, in which case they are
not associated with any subject information at any stage, visibly
or invisibly.
Tasks may collect information from the patient/subject alone,
the clinician/researcher alone, or both together. Questionnaire-
style tasks provide consistent colour-based visual cues as to
the respondent. Tasks that involve the clinician’s/researcher’s
judgement also record the details of the clinician/researcher
conducting the assessment. These details may be pre-configured
by the operator in advance so they are automatically entered,
but may be edited, for example when a tablet-wielding clinician
needs to document an assessment conducted by a more senior
clinician. Some OSs (e.g., iOS, Android) are not designed for
multi-user use, and the CamCOPS client does not offer specific
multi-user facilities, but it stores per-user data when running
under multi-user OSs.
CamCOPS also supports multimedia facilities in direct and
indirect ways. Sound is used in some tasks, and the app can
use the device’s camera to capture photographs (such as of
handwriting or other paper notes). In addition, text fields in
CamCOPS can accept input from voice-recognition dictation
systems supported by the OS.
The operating mode described above is oriented towards
interactive use by a clinician/researcher and patient/subject
together or consecutively (“clinician mode”). In addition,
CamCOPS also supports a “single user” mode. This is intended
for patients/subjects to complete tasks by themselves, for example
at home in advance of a clinic appointment or between
appointments, or as part of an ongoing research study. To use
this mode, the clinical or research team defines one or more task
schedules on the server (such as a weekly PHQ-9 for 6 weeks),
and registers the subjects. The subjects download the CamCOPS
app and enter the server’s URL (uniform resource locator) with
an identification/security code. The app is presented via a highly
simplified user interface, and will then offer tasks to the subject
automatically according to the defined schedule(s), moving data
to the server whenever a task is completed.
Viewing Completed Tasks
Once complete, tasks may be viewed on the client device (e.g.,
tablet) or the server. Tasks are visible on the tablet until they are
moved off it (typically at the point of upload to the server) and
are visible to authorized users on the server as soon as they have
been uploaded, and indefinitely thereafter.
In the client app, tasks display summary details, such as the
total score from a questionnaire, and often also a read-only
facsimile of the full task, as seen by the subject or clinician during
the task. The facsimile view is provided automatically for all
questionnaire-style tasks.
On the server, tasks provide an HTML (hypertext markup
language) view, optimized for browsing speed, or a PDF
(Portable Document Format) view, optimized for printing
(Figure 3). Both show the raw captured data, plus summary
information calculated automatically. The PDF view adds subject
identification information to all pages, making them suitable for
printing and direct use in paper-based clinical environments, and
provides space for an authenticating physical signature where
tasks have been conducted by clinicians (as opposed to tasks that
are entirely self-rated by subjects).
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FIGURE 2 | The main menu of the CamCOPS app.
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FIGURE 3 | Task examples. (A) The PHQ-9 task, a simple questionnaire. Yellow is used to highlight mandatory fields that are not yet complete. (B) A simple graphical
task: a quality-of-life standard gamble. (C) The PDF automatically generated by the server for the task in (A) after it was subsequently completed. (D) A server view of
a task capturing text from an initial psychiatric assessment. All data are entirely fictional. CMV, cytomegalovirus; GMC, UK General Medical Council; HDU, high
dependency unit; NKDA, no known drug allergies; OLT, orthotopic liver transplant; PE, pulmonary embolism.
The user may filter tasks by subject, date, task type, and
so on, but may also search also by free-text content; thus, for
example, all task instances containing the word “overdose” can
be searched for, whether those “tasks” relate to initial psychiatric
assessment, a progress note, or a comment made by a participant
in a research questionnaire.
The server also provides a summary view oriented
towards text, and another oriented towards numerical
data (Figure 4), both available in HTML and PDF format.
The clinical text view shows all tasks for a given subject,
optionally constrained by date, and shows key text from
each task (e.g., summary scores for cognitive assessments or
mood questionnaires, or all text for clinical assessments and
progress notes), with hyperlinks to the full tasks for further
detail. The numerical trackers show trends in numerical
information over time in graphical format (such as for
mood disorder questionnaire summary scores, or body mass
index [BMI]).
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FIGURE 4 | Some multi-task views provided by the server. (A) Clinical text view. (B) Numerical tracker view. All data are fictional. CMV, cytomegalovirus; HDU, high
dependency unit; OLT, orthotopic liver transplant; PE, pulmonary embolism.
Task Information
The online documentation (20) includes help pages for all
CamCOPS tasks, hyperlinked to from the app itself. The help
pages include details of each task’s history and provenance, with
links to key studies such as on the task’s validity and reliability,
where applicable. It remains for end-user clinicians/researchers
to establish the applicability of a particular task to a given
subject/patient in their context.
Internationalization
Text used by the client and server software is internationalized,
supporting arbitrary languages (with current text for English and
Danish), and the task framework supports internationalization of
individual tasks. Where tasks supported by CamCOPS have been
translated and that translation validated, the framework permits
the translated versions to be selected automatically. Users choose
their preferred language dynamically.
Interfaces for Research
While clinicians typically focus on a single patient at a time,
researchers typically analyse data frommultiple subjects together.
The CamCOPS server allows suitably authorized users to
download data in bulk, for exporting to other databases or
manipulation in spreadsheets or statistical software. Download
formats include Microsoft Excel (XLSX), OpenOffice/LibreOffice
(ODS open document spreadsheet format), tab-separated values
(TSV), R script (24) (though R can also read a number of
other structured formats exported by CamCOPS), textual SQL
(structured query language), and binary SQLite format (25). In
addition, users can view raw and calculated data in structured
XML (extensible markup language) format. Administrators may
export data in bulk, including via formats suitable for third-party
anonymisation tools (26).
Following the DRY (“don’t repeat yourself ”) principle of
software engineering (27), CamCOPS stores raw data, not
calculated data. For example, PHQ-9 information is stored as
a set of answers to each of the 10 questions; the summary
scores are not stored but are calculated “live” upon request.
BMI information is stored as height and mass, and so on. The
method of calculation of summary scores is specific to each task.
To simplify research and to reduce errors caused by researchers
having to calculate summary scores, CamCOPS calculates these.
The system offers a basic research data dump oriented towards
convenience, in which most tasks provide a single spreadsheet-
style page. This has one row per task instance, including includes
raw data, summary scores (calculated at the moment of request),
and subject identifiers together.
The CamCOPS server is an interface to a relational database
with a well-defined structure. It is conceivable—but in our
view highly unlikely—that institutions would wish to give users
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direct access to this database (which would circumvent standard
security controls). However, for full access to relevant raw data,
CamCOPS allows authorized users to download a relational
database containing data of interest to and permitted to them,
as well as downloading structured data directly to statistical
packages such as R (24) (Figure 5). Relational database export is
more powerful but more complex for users. Summary scores are
also provided automatically in this situation, by calculating them
as the download is created.
Group System
A given institution may need to capture data in several different
contexts. For example, it might provide a number of clinical
services. Staff in those services might want to analyse their
service’s data in isolation but also see data for their patients
that has been collected by other clinical services. Simultaneously,
the institution might support clinical research using identifiable
data. Researchers might typically be allowed to see only the
data collected for their subjects as part of their study (while,
simultaneously, clinicians looking after those patientsmight want
to see any clinically relevant data, collected as part of the research
or otherwise). Finally, the institution might support research
using pseudonymised data.
CamCOPS supports these usage scenarios simultaneously via
groups. A group might represent, for example, a clinical service
or a specific research study. Users belong to one or more groups,
and upload data into a specific group at any one time. A group
has its own set of ID policies (as above), and may, as a whole,
be permitted to see data from specific other groups. Thus,
for example, a clinical group might use fully identifiable data
according to a certain identification standard, while a research
group may use a study-specific pseudonym and prohibit direct
identifiers. A researcher might belong to one or more research
study groups, and only be permitted to see data collected within
them. A different clinical research groupmight use an ID number
type in common with clinical services, and the system can be
configured to allow clinicians to see data from all clinical services
plus “research” data for the same patients, without researchers
being able to see “clinical” data.
While is also possible to run multiple instances of the
CamCOPS server, the group system is intended to make this
unnecessary for most purposes.
Export Facilities
Individual users may wish to download different subsets of
data in various formats (as above), but it may also be desirable
to export data systematically from the server. A prototypical
example would be the need to copy clinically relevant data to
an institution’s primary EHR system. CamCOPS supports export
in different formats (including PDF, HTML, and XML) and via
different transmission methods [including via HL7 (30), e-mail,
and file-based export]. Exports can be scheduled and/or triggered
by the arrival of a task on the server. CamCOPS also supports
direct export to relational databases, and to REDCap (31) via
an open-source interface (32). We are also seeking to improve
integration with other EHR systems, via standard information
exchange methods such as FHIR (33).
Other Administrative Operations
Subject to permission, users can run reports on the server. These
include activity reports and search tools. Group administrators
can manage users within their groups, and superusers have full
control over the whole system.
To assist compliance with NHS records management
procedures (34–37), specific records can be erased of content
or deleted entirely by privileged users. All records for a given
patient can be deleted entirely, as might be required after a certain
number of years have elapsed, or in a research context if a subject
withdraws consent. Records can be annotated manually by users
with annotation authority (for example, to indicate an error or
that the patient disputes its contents) and patient details can be
corrected (for example, if a name was misspelled).
IMPLEMENTATION
Software Platforms
The client app is written in C++ (38) using the open-source
Qt cross-platform framework (39). CamCOPS has been used
on Android devices, iOS devices (e.g., Apple iPad), Windows
tablets, and conventional desktop computers (Windows, Linux,
macOS). Application data is stored in an encrypted database
using SQLCipher (40), based on SQLite (25). Cryptography is
provided by OpenSSL (41), developed from SSLeay (42).
The CamCOPS server is cross-platform software written
in Python (43). It is supplied with HTTP (hypertext transfer
protocol) servers including CherryPy (44) and Gunicorn (45),
which may be used directly or via a more sophisticated web
server such as the Apache HTTP Server (46). It is normally
run under Linux (47) (tested with Ubuntu/Debian and CentOS).
CamCOPS typically uses the open-source MySQL/MariaDB
database (48, 49) but supports others via SQLAlchemy (50).
A Docker Compose containerized application is provided for
consistency and ease of installation (51).
Distribution
Documentation is online (20). The source code and some binaries
are available from GitHub (52). The Android client app is
available via the Android Google Play Store, and the iOS version
via the Apple App Store. Apple prohibits public distribution, by
other routes, of applications that can be installed on arbitrary iOS
devices (53).
Data Storage and Synchronization
CamCOPS stores its data using standard relational database
mechanisms (54). A simple format is used, with a table to record
subject details, a linked table to record ID numbers, and one
or more tables for each task, linked to the subject table except
in the case of anonymous tasks. The app records the time of
last modification for all records. Tasks also record their creation
time, the time the task was first exited, and whether the task was
completed or aborted at that time. This allows measurement of
the time it takes to complete a task. Dates and times captured by
tasks are stored in ISO-8601 format, with time zone information
and arbitrary temporal precision (by default accurate to 1ms
to allow reaction time recording). Binary large objects (BLOBs)
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FIGURE 5 | Some research-oriented methods of data access. (A) Structured data in a relational database downloaded from CamCOPS. An SQLite database (25) is
shown in SQLiteStudio (28). (B) Data downloaded and imported directly into R (24), shown inside RStudio (29). All data are fictional.
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such as images are stored in the database; this is not definitively
better or worse than storage in a filesystem (with the database
holding a reference to the file), but storage in the database has the
advantage of being easily ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation,
durability) compliant.
Subject identification is one area where CamCOPS departs
from the DRY principle (27). The CamCOPS server maintains
copies of each device’s patient identification records, as of the
moment of each upload. It does so because repetition is a
key safety feature to ensure correct patient identification in
clinical environments, and because the use of additional non-
unique identifiers is important for clinical safety. For example,
if clinical records only had NHS numbers on them, they would
be technically correct but clinically useless, because clinicians
think of patients by their name. CamCOPS does not fetch other
details; for example, when given an ID number, it does not fetch
a patient’s forename/surname from a national or institutional
database. Therefore, users need to enter this information. Of
course, several CamCOPS users can enter data about the same
patient on different devices, and it is possible for users to enter
incorrect name/number combinations or to misspell names. The
appropriate logical mechanism to link multiple records about the
same patient is defined by the host institution, but is typically
by the use of a single standardized institutional or national
ID number. When the CamCOPS server interface combines
records, linking them by the desired method (e.g., institutional
ID number), it warns the user prominently if any records
contain incompatible information (e.g., misspelled names or
non-matching dates of birth). Suitably authorized users can
correct mistakes (e.g., misspelled names) on the server, once
records have been finalized to the server. CamCOPS contains
framework code to support validation of subject identity at the
point of upload (e.g., against an institutional database), but this
has not been used concretely yet.
No history information is stored in the client app’s database,
but history information is added by the server. Servers
distinguish records from different client devices using a unique
device identifier. The server also marks uploaded records with
a Boolean “current” flag. When a record is re-uploaded, the old
record is marked as no longer current, linked to its successor, and
its time of removal and removing user recorded, while the new
record is marked current, linked to its predecessor, and its time
of addition and adding user recorded. This allows a modification
history to be followed, and permits linking of contemporaneous
information across multiple tables.
The client app can copy data to the server, but may also
move data by uploading it, wiping it from local storage, and
starting afresh. A “move” may be accomplished for individual
anonymous tasks, for all tasks associated with a particular subject
or subjects, or for all data on the device. Optionally, basic subject
identifiers can be preserved on the device to speed the entry
of subsequent data for the same subject. The server manages
this “move or copy” capability by adding a further “era” field,
which is either the string literal “NOW” (for records still present
on the device) or the date/time that the data was uploaded
and wiped from the device. Using these mechanisms, which
allow the server to store multiple snapshots of a device’s state
over time, records can be wiped from the device yet remain
available on the server, or be modified and “overwritten” on
the server, leaving a historical trail of modifications available
for inspection.
Uploads are accomplished as atomic transactions; that is, they
succeed in their entirety or fail as a whole. This preserves the
relational structure of the database in the face of unexpected
network disruption.
Hardware Platforms and Costs
CamCOPS has been used on tablets, touchscreen laptops, and
conventional laptop/desktop computers. In practice, we have
found that hardware keyboards (e.g., Bluetooth keyboards for
tablets) are essential for any form of data capture that uses
text extensively, such as clinical note-taking, because on-screen
keyboards are slow to operate. The choice of tablet may depend
on price, on the form of network connectivity desired (e.g.,
Wi-Fi only vs. Wi-Fi plus 3G/4G cellular data), and on the
software distribution model desired. For example, Android
tablets can install software from the Google Play Store, but
can also install software downloaded from arbitrary web sites.
Thus, an institution could download the CamCOPS code, modify
it for its own purposes, compile it using the open-source
development tools, and distribute it on its own internal or public-
facing web site. In contrast, distribution to iPad devices is only
permissible via the Apple App Store or via internal distribution
by organizations or individuals who pay for the Apple iOS
Developer Program (53, 55).
CamCOPS is free of charge, but the system as a whole requires
some infrastructure. In a university research environment, a
simple server installation requires only a single Linux physical
server or virtual machine with a network connection, plus a
transport layer security (TLS)/secure sockets layer (SSL) X.509
certificate (“SSL certificate”) for secure HTTP (HTTPS). In a UK
NHS clinical research environment, such a server may need to
operate within a secure network, and there may be additional
costs for virtual private network (VPN) access to that network
from outside. Themain additional cost is for client devices, which
vary according to user preference (e.g., Android tablet; iPad;
Windows tablet; touchscreen laptop). The client devices must be
able to communicate with the server (e.g., via a wired connection,
Wi-Fi, or 3G/4G cellular data).
Performance
The server is optimized for performance using multithreading
or multiprocessing and caching systems. The basic overhead
of the scripts is very low: a server with an Intel dual-
core 3 GHz processor and solid-state disks took 3 ± 1ms
(mean ± standard deviation) to process an HTTP transaction,
retrieve and validate session information from the database,
and return the main menu (n = 100). Retrieving a PHQ-9
task in HTML format took 9.5 ± 1.9ms (n = 100), including
the time taken to audit the request. Registration of a mobile
device took 10.6 ± 0.4ms (n = 100) including approximately
6ms for password cryptography, which is deliberately slow
in the bcrypt system (56). Performance in practice depends
also on the underlying database and hardware; MySQL offers
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the option to trade full ACID compliance for performance
via the innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit option (48), set for
speed during the benchmarks given above. The client is
similarly optimized for performance, including the use of a
multithreaded database handler so that encryption does not slow
the user interface.
Writing New Tasks
CamCOPS has >120 tasks and more are regularly added.
Many psychiatric assessment scales use a questionnaire style,
with multiple-choice fields, yes/no fields, free text, and other
common input elements. Other tasks may require significant
programming, such as cognitive assessment tasks that present
stimuli and measure responses in a time-sensitive or complex
way. The CamCOPS platform supports arbitrary tasks by
providing a questionnaire-style interface, a tabula rasa allowing
graphical and arbitrarily complex tasks, or a combination of
the two.
Free-form tasks use C++/Qt code to create tasks of
arbitrary complexity including visual animations and auditory
stimuli. Questionnaire-style tasks use a simpler standardized
interface. Questionnaires are built from combinations of
elements, including:
• static text, images, lines, and spacing;
• an audio player;
• Boolean fields (NULL/false/true) with associated text or
an image;
• a button, capable of executing arbitrary code;
• a canvas for sketching, which can display a background image;
• a countdown, to assist clinicians in timed tasks;
• date, time, and date/time pickers;
• a diagnostic code element, usable with any hierarchical
diagnostic code system such as ICD-9-CM (compatible with
DSM-IV-TR) or ICD-10 (57, 58);
• multiple-choice (1-from-n) questions (MCQs), in a variety of
common layouts;
• multiple-response (k-from-n) questions;
• photographs, taken using the mobile device’s camera, also
useful for photocopying paper records;
• inline and pop-up pickers (an alternative 1-from-
n representation);
• discrete and continuous scales represented by sliders;
• a thermometer-style scale;
• fields accepting typed input, with validation for textual or
numerical fields;
• containers for laying out other elements.
The software is designed to be extensible. Adding a new
questionnaire-style task presently requires (1) a C++
header/source file for the client app, specifying the task’s
structures and content (see excerpt in Box 1); (2) addition of that
task to the app’s master task list and menu system; (3) addition of
strings to a string file in any languages required; and (4) a Python
file for the server, specifying the table structure and the HTML
content that is automatically used to make the server’s HTML
and PDF views.
BOX 1 | C++ code snippet illustrating the core of the implementation
of a questionnaire-style task, the PHQ-9 (2), within the CamCOPS client
app. This task uses some static text, a grid-style set of multiple-choice
questions (MCQs) for questions 1–9 that all share a set of answersmapped
to the data values 0–3, and a single MCQ for question 10. Calls to the
xstring() function yield internationalized (language-/locale-speci c) task
strings; for example, xstring(“q1”) in the English locale evaluates to “1.
Little interest or pleasure in doing things,” while xstring(“a3”) evaluates to
“Nearly every day.” See Figure 3A for the resulting task.
const NameValueOptions opt ions_q1_9 {
{ x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ a0 ’ ’ ) , 0 } ,
{ x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ a1 ’ ’ ) , 1 } ,
{ x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ a2 ’ ’ ) , 2 } ,
{ x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ a3 ’ ’ ) , 3 } ,
} ;
const NameValueOptions opt ions_q10 {
{ x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ fa0 ’ ’ ) , 0 } ,
{ x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ fa1 ’ ’ ) , 1 } ,
{ x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ fa2 ’ ’ ) , 2 } ,
{ x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ fa3 ’ ’ ) , 3 } ,
} ;
QuPagePtr page ( ( new QuPage {
( new QuText ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ stem ’ ’ ) ) )−>setBo ld ( t r u e ) ,
new QuMcqGrid (
{
Quest ionWi thOneF ie ld ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ q1 ’ ’ ) , f i e l d R e f ( ‘ ‘
q1 ’ ’ ) ) ,
Quest ionWi thOneF ie ld ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ q2 ’ ’ ) , f i e l d R e f ( ‘ ‘
q2 ’ ’ ) ) ,
Quest ionWi thOneF ie ld ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ q3 ’ ’ ) , f i e l d R e f ( ‘ ‘
q3 ’ ’ ) ) ,
Quest ionWi thOneF ie ld ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ q4 ’ ’ ) , f i e l d R e f ( ‘ ‘
q4 ’ ’ ) ) ,
Quest ionWi thOneF ie ld ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ q5 ’ ’ ) , f i e l d R e f ( ‘ ‘
q5 ’ ’ ) ) ,
Quest ionWi thOneF ie ld ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ q6 ’ ’ ) , f i e l d R e f ( ‘ ‘
q6 ’ ’ ) ) ,
Quest ionWi thOneF ie ld ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ q7 ’ ’ ) , f i e l d R e f ( ‘ ‘
q7 ’ ’ ) ) ,
Quest ionWi thOneF ie ld ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ q8 ’ ’ ) , f i e l d R e f ( ‘ ‘
q8 ’ ’ ) ) ,
Quest ionWi thOneF ie ld ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ q9 ’ ’ ) , f i e l d R e f ( ‘ ‘
q9 ’ ’ ) ) ,
} ,
opt ions_q1_9
) ,
( new QuText ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ f i n a l q ’ ’ ) ) )−$>$setBold ( t r u e ) ,
new QuMcq ( f i e l d R e f ( ‘ ‘ q10 ’ ’ ) , opt ions_q10 ) ,
} )−$> $ s e t T i t l e ( x s t r i n g ( ‘ ‘ t i t l e _ma i n ’ ’ ) ) ) ;
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT
The intellectual property in the CamCOPS software must be
distinguished from the intellectual property in tasks supported
by the CamCOPS platform. The source code for CamCOPS is
licensed under the open-source GNUGeneral Public License v3+
(59). The same licence applies to tasks developed de novo by us as
part of the CamCOPS project. CamCOPS also uses some third-
party software libraries (e.g., for cryptography) with open-source
licences.We took care to ensure that all other material potentially
subject to others’ copyright, such as text from tasks developed
by others, is not included in the main CamCOPS source code.
For example, the code developed by us to present and score
a questionnaire is segregated from the text that makes up an
individual questionnaire. Furthermore, we have taken care to
ensure that all use of tasks within CamCOPS is permitted either
by the copyright declarations published with the original versions
of the tasks, or by explicit verification for each task. We have not
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included content for any task where we are aware of copyright
restrictions incompatible with distribution under an open-source
licence. CamCOPS supports tasks under the following copyright
models, ordered from least to most restrictive.
1. CamCOPS includes a number of freely available tasks. For
example, the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (2) is published
with an explicit declaration that it is in the public domain (60),
while the copyright to the National Adult Reading Test (61) is
held by its author, who kindly gave permission for its free use
in perpetuity (62).
2. Some tasks are published with a copyright declaration
allowing, for example, free non-commercial use and
reproduction with appropriate attribution, but restricting
commercial use [e.g., (63)]. CamCOPS includes user-
completed fields indicating whether the software is being used
for clinical, research, educational, and/or commercial use;
each field can take the value “yes,” “no,” or “unknown.” It
restricts some tasks on this basis, according to their published
permissions. These tasks cannot then be used outside their
copyright restrictions without explicit dishonesty by the user,
in breach of the CamCOPS terms and conditions of use that
all users must acknowledge, and of the tasks’ licensing terms.
However, it remains the user’s responsibility to check that they
are legally permitted to use each task, and to comply with any
licensing terms.
3. Some tasks allow reproduction for institutions that have paid
a license fee or undergone another registration process, but
not otherwise. To cope with these, CamCOPS supports a
method where the default task is only a data collection tool
(as for type 4 below), with copyright-free placeholder strings
such as “Question 1.” The institution may then choose to
install an XML file containing the actual task text on their
server instance(s). When the CamCOPS client app registers
with the server, it downloads any strings specific to that
institution. As these add-on XML files are not distributed
with the CamCOPS itself (merely templates), the open-source
licensing of CamCOPS does not conflict with the restricted
licensing applicable to such tasks. Responsibility for any add-
on files rests with the hosting institution, as does compliance
with any licensing terms, including any training requirements.
4. In addition, we had a local need to capture information
electronically for tasks that are distributed commercially and
cannot be distributed under an open-source licence, such as
the Beck Depression Inventory (64). For this situation, in
an attempt to improve on the research method of typing
data by hand into a spreadsheet, we developed “skeleton”
questionnaires that refer to the original questions only as
“Question 1,” “Question 2,” and so on. This method allows
data to be recorded electronically without including elements
subject to copyright, but makes the task implementation
useless except to clinicians/researchers who can refer to their
own licensed copy of the test.
We note that ascertaining copyright status can be difficult,
particularly for older tasks. For example, the Edinburgh Postnatal
Depression Scale was published with a notice saying “users may
reproduce the scale without further permission providing they
respect copyright by quoting the names of the authors, the title
and the source of the paper in all reproduced copies” (65), but this
instruction has been superseded by a different set of permissions
that prohibit unrestricted electronic reproduction (66). In all
instances, if we have inadvertently erred in our assessment of a
task’s copyright status or licensing permissions, we will remove it
from CamCOPS with our apologies if we are alerted to the fact.
INFORMATION GOVERNANCE, SECURITY,
AND AUDIT
The CamCOPS information governance and security model
is multi-layered. It is not sufficient to have a “secure”
mobile application; a hosting institution must implement other
security measures.
Minimizing Patient-Identifiable Data Held
on Mobile Devices
Assuming that identifiable information is used at all, there are
two main methods by which the CamCOPS app minimizes
the amount of patient-identifiable information held on a
mobile device.
First, data exchange with the server is essentially one-way
(upload, not download). Therefore, even if all the security
measures (see below) were somehow circumvented, possession
of a device implies possession of information about at most a few
patients, created recently on that device. The app will not retrieve
information created on other devices.
Second, its dominant method of uploading is to move data
to the server, not to copy it. Users upload when they choose,
and can be prompted whenever a new task is complete. When
they upload, they are offered a three-way choice. (1) The “move”
option moves details of all patients and their task data to the
server, deleting that data irreversibly from the device. If some
patients do not meet the server’s finalizing criteria, as above, then
the user cannot move data until this problem is fixed. (2) The
“move, keeping patients” option moves all patients’ task data, but
it keeps the basic patient details, so the user can add more tasks
for these patients later. (3) The “copy” option copies data to the
server, though it still “moves” patients or anonymous tasks that
the user has explicitly marked as “finished.”
Users are encouraged to move data whenever possible.
However, the option to copy remains important, as in the multi-
hospital example given above: when a patient has been entered
using institution B’s ID number, information must be uploaded
and stored in institution B’s records immediately, but institution
A’s numbermust later be added before that record can be finalized
and moved to the server.
Device Security
Mobile device security is provided without the need for users
to encrypt the entire device, since they might inadvertently fail
to do so. All CamCOPS data is stored using the 256-bit form
of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher suite (AES-
256) (67).
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As a general security feature, not specifically related to or
required by CamCOPS for its security, users may also choose
to encrypt their devices using a strong password. Android
devices allow on-device encryption (for Android version 3 and
higher). This encrypts applications’ data areas with a passcode
(68, 69). Apple iPads and related iOS devices invoke encryption
when a passcode is entered (70, 71). Both these platforms have
“sandboxes” to prevent one application seeing another’s data
(71, 72). After device encryption is enabled, the tablet device will
require a passcode every time it is turned on or re-activated after
its screensaver has activated. Since a misplaced tablet will lock
itself, lost or stolen tablets become useless to anyone except their
owner. Other OSs provide similar functions.
Application Security
The CamCOPS app has three security modes when running
in “clinician mode”: Locked, Unlocked, and Privileged. In the
Locked mode, the app is locked to a single subject and can only
view or add records pertaining to that subject, or anonymous
tasks. This mode is designed for a clinician/researcher to hand
the device to a subject. It takes a single touch to lock the app,
but it takes a password to unlock it. In the Unlocked mode,
all data may be viewed and edited. This mode is designed
for use by clinicians/researchers. Privileged mode is designed
for administrators’ use. In Privileged mode, features such as
the following are unlocked: configuring the link to a server,
registering the device with a server, and (if the device permits)
exporting the local database to an insecure storage area such as
a removable secure digital (SD) card. (Despite the name, there is
nothing intrinsically secure about an SD card.).
CamCOPS requires the app password to start, and to access
the encrypted databases. Since data security is prioritized, there is
no recoverymethod if this password is lost: the app would require
re-installation, with loss of any data not yet uploaded.
In typical clinical use, an administrator might set up
CamCOPS to point to the appropriate institutional server and
then give clinicians the “unlock” password but not the privileged-
mode password. This would not be impossible for an astute
clinician to circumvent, by uninstalling and reinstalling the app,
but the clinician is, after all, entrusted with the primary clinical
information in any case. In practice, this extra level of security
may help to prevent the clinician from misconfiguring the app
by accident.
Internally, the app never sends patient-identifiable data to the
device’s system logging stream, except when authorized via a
privileged-mode data dump, so a malicious user who plugs the
device into a debugging computer, such as via a Universal Serial
Bus (USB) cable, will not see patient-identifiable data that way.
The CamCOPS app stores its stores its “unlock” and privileged-
mode passwords using irreversible bcrypt hashes (56)—that
is, the passwords themselves are never stored. Moreover, the
database in which these hashes are stored is itself encrypted. The
administrator may choose, following local institutional policy,
whether the CamCOPS app stores the user’s server password
using reversible encryption or does not store it at all. Storage with
encryption is more convenient but less secure, since the password
would be potentially vulnerable to a skilled attacker in possession
of the CamCOPS app password (and the device’s unlock code, if
enabled). Not storing the password is more secure, but requires
the user to enter the password each time data is uploaded.
Network Link and Server Security
Communication between the client app and the server is secured
as follows. The app’s network link to the server is constrained
to use HTTPS and therefore link encryption. The specific
encryption used depends on the web server’s configuration;
typically, it would be configured to use TLS 1.2 with the AES
cipher suite (73). By default, the app will insist on a validated
SSL certificate, though this can be turned off by the administrator
for low-security environments that use a self-signed (“snake oil”)
SSL certificate.
Client application instances must register with a server.
This serves several purposes. Firstly, the server does not
want unauthorized devices uploading to it. Therefore, the
server will only accept uploads from registered devices, and
requires users to authenticate, with a username previously
approved by an administrator for device registration, before
accepting registration. Secondly, administrators will not want
their clinicians or researchers to upload data to unauthorized
servers. Registration is therefore a privileged-mode function. We
envisage that in practice, device registration would be managed
by an administrator for high-security environments. Thirdly, the
server and the app should share a set of ID descriptions and
upload/finalizing policies (see “Subject identification” above).
The app reads the ID descriptions and policies from the
server at registration, and re-checks these before commencing
an upload.
The server requires username/password identification before
it will accept an upload, and requires that the device be validly
registered. Devices are distinguished by a unique device identifier
(a long random number). The server accepts incoming data but
will not provide unrelated data to the app. Therefore, even a
hand-crafted app masquerading as an instance of CamCOPS
and in possession of a valid username, password, and device
ID cannot download sensitive data via the app–server link. The
server will not add new fields or tables based on the claims of the
uploading agent, and will not upload to reserved tables or fields.
The server takes standard precautions against SQL injection (74).
Communication between users and the server via the
web front end is secured as follows. The web front end is
constrained to use HTTPS and therefore link encryption. This
requires appropriate configuration of the web server hosting
the CamCOPS installation, but is also ensured by CamCOPS
through its session security methods. Access is governed by
username/password pairs. The server stores all CamCOPS
passwords using irreversible hashes (56); passwords themselves
are not stored. The only session information stored on the
client side is a HTTPS-only session cookie containing a server-
generated session ID and token; the token is regenerated by the
server at login to prevent session fixation (75). Sessions expire
after a defined period of inactivity and cannot be transferred
between client Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Administrators
configure amaximumpassword lifetime. The server will lock user
accounts for increasing periods of time in response to multiple
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login failures. It will mimic normal login failure behaviour
for non-existent usernames, including the time it would
normally take for password cryptography, to prevent automated
username discovery. Optionally, administrators may require
multi-factor authentication, such as via e-mail, text message
(short message service, SMS), or a third-party authenticator app
(e.g., Google Authenticator).
Internally, the server must deal briefly with a clear-text
database password, but encapsulates all such code with an
error-trapping framework to prevent the password leaking,
and promptly discards the password after connecting to
its database.
Access to data via the server’s web front end is governed
by user-based and group-based permissions. Users themselves
may have superuser status (which gives unrestricted access to
data and administrative functions via the front end), or be
“locked” to a single patient record (when that user belongs to a
patient/subject for “single-patient” mode), or be a routine “staff”
user. Users may be a member of one or more groups. At any
time, one group is selected to receive data uploaded by that
user.Groupswere discussed above. Groups define patient/subject
identification criteria (e.g., fully identifiable vs. pseudonymised)
and intellectual property restrictions. Groups “own” subsets of
data, but groups (and thus their members) can also be granted
permission to view data from specific other groups. User–group
associations (group memberships) are associated with a further
set of permissions: to administer the group (e.g., manage users
within that group), plus individual permissions to upload data, to
register new client devices, to log in via the web front end, to view
data for multiple subjects when no subject search criteria have
been applied, to export data in bulk, to run reports, or to attach
notes to uploaded tasks. These permissions provide fine-grained
control over what users can see and do, but a security breach of a
group administrator account, or even worse a superuser account,
would permit large-scale access to CamCOPS data held on
the server.
The server must also be secured in other ways that are
outside the scope of the CamCOPS system itself but are
nevertheless critical. Standard security considerations include
limiting physical access to the server; preventing visibility on
public networks (e.g., limiting visibility to internal institutional
networks or via secure VPN access to them); configuring
a firewall appropriately; limiting secure shell (SSH) access;
ensuring that the web server does not offer CamCOPS data by any
route other than via the CamCOPS web front end itself; ensuring
that no inappropriate users have access to the back-end database
systems stored on the server; ensuring that the server is backed
up regularly; ensuring physical security of backups; and ensuring
server availability (e.g., in the face of power failure) should this
be required.
“Analytics” Security
It is commonplace amongst mobile applications to send
information about application usage back to the application’s
creators. CamCOPS does not do this. No information is sent
by the client app except to the chosen institutional server, and
no information is exported by the server except as permitted or
configured by the local administrator.
Black Hat’s Options
It is important to ask of any potentially sensitive system: what
would it take to steal its data? Several methods are possible
for CamCOPS:
• Steal a device, the device’s OS password, and its CamCOPS app
password together. This would allow existing records, still on
that device, to be viewed.
• Steal a device, the device’s OS password, its CamCOPS
app password, and its CamCOPS privileged-mode password
together.This would allow records still on that device to be sent
to a “dark” server of the attacker’s choosing.
• Steal a user’s CamCOPS server password, and a means of
accessing the network on which the server is held. This would
allow the attacker to view data on the server (subject to the
permissions granted to that user). If the server is on the
open Internet, the network security requirement is eliminated,
emphasizing the importance of network security for sensitive
data, as well as strong passwords. This is the route of attack
requiring particular security focus, since a predominant route
of data theft is via “social engineering” rather than technical
methods (76, 77). This risk is mitigated by requiring multi-
factor authentication (as above).
• Break into the server and gain direct access to its database. This
emphasizes the importance of securing the server.
These methods of attack may appear plausible but should not
be possible:
• Steal a device and the device’s OS password, “root” the device to
bypass factory default access restrictions, and access the tablet’s
CamCOPS SQLite database directly. This would yield only
CamCOPS app databases encrypted with AES-256.
• Steal a tablet that has not been properly secured with a device
(OS) password, or in other ways bypass the OS security. As
before, without the CamCOPS password, this would yield only
an AES-256-encrypted database.
• Steal a tablet and the tablet’s OS password, download the open-
source CamCOPS app, modify it, install it over the existing
app without deleting the app data (bypassing any OS-specific
digital signature checks on software installation), and attempt
to use the modified app to export data. Since the CamCOPS
app does not know the password used to encrypt a given
user’s data, this conveys no benefit to the attacker; the database
remains encrypted.
Once a computer is stolen, it can be dismantled. One must
therefore consider also the possibility of breaking the encryption.
No practical method is known of breaking the AES algorithm
used to encrypt tablet data. The US National Security Agency
approves AES for US government information classified Secret
(for AES-128 or higher) or Top Secret (for AES-192 or higher)
(67) and the UK NHS approves it for clinical data (16).
CamCOPS uses AES-256. To give a sense of scale, a brute-force
attack on an n-bit key takes a mean of 0.5 × 2n + 0.5 cycles;
therefore, a 256-bit key would take approximately 1.83 × 1059
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years to discover by this method with a 10 GHz attack frequency.
The universe is 1.38× 1010 years old.
Other Means of Ensuring Security of
Patient-Identifiable Data
If a mobile device or other computer can “see” data on a
remote server, then those data can be captured, even if by the
simple expedient of saving a screenshot or taking a photograph
of the device. This applies to any computer program, not
just CamCOPS. Therefore, technical constraints are insufficient:
users must be prohibited by cultural (institutional and/or
legal) constraints from saving or storing patient-identifiable
information on mobile devices in non-permitted ways. Similarly,
users must be encouraged to look after their computer devices
carefully, locking them when not in active use.
Audit Trails
Client-side audit trails are minimal, but the app time-stamps all
tasks at their creation, and time-stamps the last modification to
any record, as well as collecting information relevant to the time it
takes to complete each task. In contrast, there is significant audit
logging on the server. The CamCOPS server maintains a number
of task-specific tables. To each record, the server adds fields
allowing an audit trail. When a record is modified or deleted,
the old versions are kept. The server’s tables therefore contain a
snapshot of each device’s current state, and a complete audit trail,
whose granularity is the frequency of uploads from a particular
device. Access requests to the server via the web interface are also
audited and logged, as are command-line CamCOPS operations
by administrators.
Security Against Data Loss
Crashes in the CamCOPS app should not (and in our experience
during development, do not) affect data integrity, because
the SQLite back-end, with perhaps 500 million deployments
worldwide (78), is designed to cope with this (79, 80).
Additionally, only a small quantity of data is ever stored on
the device, since data is regularly moved to the server, so the
vulnerability to data loss from a device or app fault is in any
case small. When the app upload its data, the process is atomic,
meaning that the transaction either succeeds as a whole or fails
as a whole, and does not leave the databases in a “halfway” state.
Data on the server is typically stored using the well-established
MySQL/MariaDB database system (48, 49).
Data loss remains possible. Reasons for this may include
factors outside the CamCOPS system, such as a server
environment that is insufficiently robust to cope with power loss
or disaster. An amateurish example would be a server without an
uninterruptible power supply (UPS). An example of server failure
in an NHS high-availability environment was the Buncefield
oil depot explosion on 11 December 2005, which temporarily
disabled some laboratory computer systems used by our local
acute hospital because a major computing provider was located
near that depot.
As with any software system (81), it is also possible that
the CamCOPS system might contain undiscovered bugs and
therefore lose data. During development, in addition to human
testing, several other steps are taken to minimize this possibility.
CamCOPS includes an automated unit testing framework. We
use a continuous integration (CI) service to run the automated
tests every time the server code is changed, thus checking for
software regressions, and the CI service also checks against
a database of any reported security vulnerabilities in the
Python packages used. For the client app, C++ compilation
automatically detects some categories of error (82). We have a
process of peer review for substantial code changes. In day-to-day
operation, the server verifies that task information is complete,
and valid (i.e., that all field values are permitted for that task), or
warns the user accordingly. It also catches any potential internal
errors to ensure that all transactions end in a database commit or
a database rollback, meaning that any crashes that might occur
within the server do not corrupt data or leave database locks held
and block other processes.
However, CamCOPS is not presently accredited to NHS
Interoperability Toolkit (ITK) standards or certified as a primary
part of a clinical record. Therefore, a core requirement of
data security would be to ensure that any information of
sufficient importance be copied (e.g., in fully structured or PDF
format) promptly from CamCOPS to a certified information
storage system, such as an institution’s primary EHR. To enable
automatic copying of CamCOPS data into a certified information
storage system, CamCOPS provides automatic export facilities
(as above).
Security and Risk Comparate
One matter that is easily overlooked in discussions of technical
security measures is the relative security or risk of an electronic
approach compared to its alternatives, which are often far from
risk-free. In areas with no Internet connectivity, the alternative
to storing patient-identifiable data on a mobile device is usually
to write it down. Paper-based methods can be less secure than
their electronic equivalents (83). In addition, manual scoring of
cognitive assessment scales is vulnerable to assessor cognitive
error (84–86) and this in itself represents a degree of clinical
risk. Paper-based methods can also limit clinical information
transfer, if handwriting is unclear or becomes unclear through
photocopying or faxing, or if the time required to copy or
summarize information means that only a subset of information
is transferred.
Legacy Security
Legacy security refers to the possibility that changes in hardware
or software render old data inaccessible or unusable, such as
when software applications refuse to start after expiry of a licence
period. The CamCOPS code is open source, so can be installed,
modified, and used freely by anyone, and should only include
tasks/questionnaires that are in the public domain or where
permission exists to use the task in perpetuity. As a last resort
there is a clear procedure should the legal position on a task ever
change, allowing removal of disputed content but preservation
of all data: namely to remove or replace disallowed text and/or
media from the app’s and the server’s resource files, leaving the
code intact. This would result in a stripped-down data capture
task and the ability to display and manipulate old data, as
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described above. Third-party code and development tools used
by CamCOPS are similarly open source.
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR USE
IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH
Software Regulations and Limitations
While we have tried to ensure that CamCOPS is reliable and
accurate, the terms and conditions of use include a disclaimer to
the effect that the authors and distributors are not responsible
for errors or liable for any consequences of users’ reliance upon
the content provided with CamCOPS. Content contained in
or accessed through CamCOPS should not be relied upon for
medical purposes in any way; if medical advice is required, users
should seek expert medical assistance. CamCOPS is intended for
use under the supervision of medical practitioners or researchers
conducting ethically approved academic research.
Regarding the European Union Medical Devices Directive
(87): CamCOPS is not intended primarily for the diagnosis
and/or monitoring of human disease. It has not yet undergone
a conformity assessment under the Medical Devices Directive,
and thus cannot be described as or put into service as a medical
device. We note that Medical Device approval is typically not
required for research software tools, during research where
there is no medical purpose for the device (88); such research
has its own regulatory controls. Nor is it typically needed for
software systems where the software does not interpret data,
merely storing and transmitting it without change (for example,
Medical Device approval is not needed for word processors,
spreadsheets, databases, or e-mail systems that may sometimes
contain medical data) (89); many CamCOPS tasks relating to
clinical work perform no such interpretation. We are continuing
to explore this evolving area of regulation.
Local Clinical and Research Approvals
In addition to these caveats, use within NHS England would
require appropriate local NHS Trust approval (17). The
CamCOPS system stores small quantities of patient-identifiable
data on an encrypted mobile device for a limited period of
time. NHS England guidelines allow this possibility subject to (a)
strict rules regarding encryption, such as suitable cryptographic
algorithms used with strong passwords; (b) all such devices
being owned by the Trust, disallowing mobile devices owned
by clinicians personally; and (c) Trust Information Governance
and Caldicott Guardian approval (13, 16, 90). Device encryption
on iPads uses AES-256 (71), while Android uses AES-128 (69,
91); both satisfy NHS encryption guidelines (16). CamCOPS
data encryption, as above, is in addition to this. NHS Scotland
guidelines classify data using a traffic-light system according to
the risk of patient identification and harm or distress caused
by loss (92). Patient-identifiable data relating to mental states
would be classified as amber or red—likely often red. When
applied to the CamCOPS system, which holds information
transiently offline on a mobile device, these standards would
require NHS-owned devices with whole-disk encryption and a
strong password (92).
As noted above, CamCOPS is not a primary EHR system
and it is critical that any clinically relevant data be copied to
an institution’s primary EHR. CamCOPS provides mechanisms
for this to occur automatically (see above), subject to the EHR
having the capability to receive it (see below for discussion of one
possible fallback position with EHRs that do not).
In a research context, information-handling procedures will
be directed by an appropriate national or institutional research
governance framework [e.g., (93, 94)]. Clinical information
governance guidelines are typically at least as stringent as
guidelines that govern research with volunteers who have
given explicit consent to research, and more stringent than
guidelines covering pseudonymised or anonymised records, or
non-sensitive information. CamCOPS was therefore designed
against clinical information governance standards.
All tasks allowing free-text entry, and many established
structured questionnaires in psychiatry, permit the capture
of risk-related information, such as about suicidality. If
such information is captured without direct supervision by
a clinician, it is vital that a clinical service or research
study has approved methods for handling such information.
Most critically, patients/subjects must be aware that reporting
information to an app is not a substitute for talking to their
clinical/research team or obtaining emergency health care if
required. Users must indicate that they understand this in order
to use the app, but appropriate expectations must also be set by
the institution operating the software.
Experimental Tasks
CamCOPS is designed to operate as a translational research
platform, implementing human-specific and cross-species tasks
derived from basic neuroscience research. Some experimental
tasks are included in CamCOPS and are clearly labelled as such;
more may be added.
EARLY EXPERIENCES
CamCOPS development began in 2012 and the first version
of the client, written in the Titanium cross-platform Javascript
framework (95), was available in 2013 together with a Python-
based server. The system was developed incrementally, except
that in 2017 the client was rewritten in C++/Qt for better
performance and power, and the server reworked. CamCOPS
was first approved for clinical use in October 2014 within
Cambridgeshire & PeterboroughNHS Foundation Trust (CPFT),
and has been used both for clinical and research purposes. It
has been deployed for research within CPFT, the University
of Cambridge, and at academic institutions in Denmark and
Singapore. It has been used on Android tablets including the
Asus TF201, Asus TF300T, and Sony Xperia Z2 Tablet, and
touchscreen Windows devices including the Microsoft Surface
Book 2. Our experience has been that Windows tablets provide
familiarity and multi-purpose computing for many users, whilst
Android tablets can be cheap. All these operating systems support
offline voice-recognition dictation systems, as described above,
though we have found physical keyboards considerably more
accurate for text entry.
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As a clinical example, CamCOPS has been operational in
CPFT’s perinatal mental health service since 2019, where it is
used to record questionnaire data relating to symptoms and
service experience. Notably, the version of the EHR system in use
did not have the capability to receive an automatic data “feed”
from CamCOPS.We therefore used the poor substitute of having
CamCOPS automatically e-mail tasks (on receipt) via an internal
secure e-mail system to an administrative team, who uploaded
them to the patient’s EHR.
Examples in a research context include the Insight study (96)
and MOJO study (Khandaker, NHS research ethics reference
19/EE/0233) examining the relationship between systemic
inflammation and mood symptoms, in which CamCOPS has
been used to capture a range of data encompassing medical
history, affective symptoms including a standardized self-report
computerized interview (21, 22), physical symptoms such as
fatigue and joint inflammation, and quality-of-life measures.
COMPARISON TO OTHER SYSTEMS;
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
There are a large number of free and commercial applications
offering data capture for psychiatry-oriented questionnaires such
as the PHQ-9, and similarly many web sites for users to
design and offer generic surveys for free or via a variety of
commercial models. Some systems offer extensively validated
complex cognitive assessment tasks via a closed-source model
with provider-hosted data [e.g., (97, 98)]. Others use a range
of data collection techniques (mobile apps, web interfaces, text
messaging) to collect information in specific clinical domains,
such as for mood monitoring [e.g., (99)] or to detect psychiatric
morbidity in general hospital contexts [e.g., (100)]. REDCap (31)
is one widely used general-purpose research system, free but
not open source (101–103), oriented towards flexible online data
capture and using a model where institutions host their own
instance (31, 102, 103).
CamCOPS differs from these systems in some ways, and
at times complements them. Of course, all major design
decisions come with trade-offs. We see the major decisions
as follows.
Firstly, CamCOPS is free and open-source software; moreover,
it has a “copyleft” licence that ensures derivative works must
remain open source. This eliminates direct software costs and
allows public scrutiny of the code, but may reduce the incentive
for commercialization and commercial support. It also prevents
the full incorporation of tasks incompatible with this licensing
model. Careful intellectual property review is required with
respect to new tasks (see above), though that would be true
regardless of the software licence.
Second, we follow the principle of institutional hosting. This
offers institutions complete ownership and control of their data,
but comes with the burden of having to provide, obtain, or
outsource relevant computing infrastructure and some burden of
computer administration.
Third, CamCOPS can operate offline. This major design
decision reflected our need to operate in offline environments
such as on domiciliary visits to mobile phone (cellular data)
“black spots” for our network providers, or in acute hospital
environments with radiofrequency shielding or lack of Wi-Fi
for other reasons. This inevitably excludes the much simpler
software model where all testing is performed online via a web
site, and it brings complexities in development, data security
management (discussed above), and deployment (such as
upgrading client apps). A benefit is that the client, being written
in a high-performance low-level general-purpose programming
language, is essentially unrestricted; thus, CamCOPS can and
does implement animated tasks, generalized linear modelling,
and so forth.
Fourth, we support on-device “registration” of new
subjects/patients, and support multiple groups and identification
policies. This adds clinical flexibility (e.g., capturing data in
relation to an emergency referral prior to administrative patient
registration) and supports a variety of clinical and research
settings, from fully identified clinical work, to a mix of clinical
and research work, to de-identified research. However, it adds
complexity and can require more later verification than a model
in which all patients are registered in advance on the server
according to a unified identity policy. In practice, since the
identity policy (or policies) is configured by the local system
administrator, this balance is in large part determined by the
hosting institution according to its needs.
Fifth, the tight security for data stored transiently on mobile
devices, with its principle of data minimization, brings some
trade-offs, such as the absence of a view of historical data “on the
fly” within the mobile app. If historical CamCOPS information
needs to be viewed, that is presently not supported “offline” but
only via online web access to the server. This may limit utility in
some situations.
Sixth, tasks are implemented at present as part of the
CamCOPS code base, rather than being user-defined [cf. e.g.,
(31)]. An advantage is that tasks are developed as “canonical”
versions, with their source code open—for example, everyone can
check to see if there is a logical error in the implementation of
a task. We have also found that the requirement to implement
aspects of each task in both C++ and Python serves as an
intrinsic cross-check for this kind of error, although it involves
some extra work. It also brings the benefit that tasks are
unconstrained—that is, they can use any feature of a general-
purpose programming language—rather than being constrained
by the limitations of a scripting environment, so they can be
tailored to achieve a good user interface and experience. The
obvious disadvantage is that CamCOPS is not well-suited for
the creation of new questionnaires specific to a clinical service
or research study on a rapid, ad hoc basis (including research
workflow tasks such as recording consent); CamCOPS may
therefore complement software designed for that purpose in a
clinical [e.g., (104)] or research [e.g., (31)] environment. It also
requires more programming experience to develop new tasks
than simpler systems.
Finally, we note that in the clinical domain there is often
tension between different modes of data capture that we see as
stemming from a lack of interoperability. Many EHR systems are
not designed to be used by patients at all, but are designed for
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clinicians to enter data. In the UK, this is changing gradually
with the advent of “patient portals” and EHR-connected apps,
but while some EHRs can capture basic questionnaire data
from patients directly, we know of none that can capture
structured data from complex clinician-assisted tasks [e.g., (3)]
or animated cognitive assessments [e.g., (23)] directly into the
EHR via a convenient interface. This creates demand for systems
that can, and that situation is likely to persist—primary EHR
systems do a lot, but they cannot do everything. Accordingly,
we suggest that the future focus in this area should be on
using the “best tool for the job”—capturing directly into the
EHR as the first preference, but using external tools (such as
CamCOPS or others) where required—plus work to improve
the integration of external systems and EHRs, so that data flows
seamlessly in the most structured way possible as well as the most
clinically relevant.
SUMMARY
Regardless of the current and future sophistication of phenotype
measurement via passive data collection (105), in our view
overt data capture will continue to remain central to digital
phenotyping in psychiatry. We present CamCOPS, a free and
open-source client–server system for direct data capture in
the general area of psychiatry, psychology, and the clinical
neurosciences. It runs on multiple platforms and emphasizes
touchscreen data capture. It has both clinical and research
applications and is designed to operate against stringent
information governance requirements, with hosting institutions
having complete ownership and control of the data they
collect. It can operate with fully identifiable or de-identified
information. We discuss security concerns that would apply to
any system of this kind, and describe the approaches used in
CamCOPS. It provides summary views on the data that we
believe are useful for clinicians, whilst retaining full structured
data for research, and it supports multiple export mechanisms
to communicate with other systems. It implements a large
and growing family of tasks, ranging from questionnaires to
animated cognitive assessments, with techniques to address
a range of licensing and intellectual property rules. We
discuss its strengths and weaknesses and report on some early
practical uses.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Publicly available datasets were analyzed in this study. This data
can be found at: https://camcops.readthedocs.io/; https://github.
com/RudolfCardinal/camcops.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
RC designed and wrote CamCOPS (2012−) and drafted the
manuscript. MB contributed to the design and development
(2019−). Both authors contributed, edited, and approved the
final manuscript.
FUNDING
RC was supported by a Wellcome Trust postdoctoral fellowship
(091998/Z/10/Z). RC’s and MB’s research was supported by
a UK Medical Research Council (MRC) Mental Health Data
Pathfinder grant (MC_PC_17213 to RC). Deployment was
supported in part by theUKNational Institute of Health Research
(NIHR) Cambridge Biomedical Research Centre (BRC-1215-
20014). The work was conducted within the Behavioural and
Clinical Neuroscience Institute, supported by the Wellcome
Trust (093875/Z/10/Z) and the MRC (G1000183).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Martin Denton for security advice and technical
support; Ed Bullmore for institutional support; Julia Deakin
and Hannah Clarke for helpful discussion and piloting; Rob
Smithies, Chris Randall, Melanie Coombes, Philip Cave, Mai
Wong, Tim Simmance, Gerhard Smith, Cathy Walsh, Mike Bell,
and Jane Berezynskyj for assistance in planning and hardware
bids; Richard Matt for support with the technical aspects
of proposals and for commissioning independent penetration
testing; Chess Denman and CPFT’s Information Governance
Committee for approvals; JonathonArtingstall for support; Jenny
Nelder for project management; Joe Kearney for developing
some tasks; Trish Barker-Barrett, Jules Mackenzie and colleagues
for the perinatal service deployment; Rosemary Boyle and Ted
Krawec for advice; multiple copyright holders (see software
documentation) for permission to use specific tasks; and three
referees for helpful suggestions.
REFERENCES
1. Guo T, Xiang Y-T, Xiao L, Hu C-Q, Chiu HFK, Ungvari GS, et al.
Measurement-based care versus standard care for major depression: a
randomized controlled trial with blind raters. Am J Psychiatry. (2015)
172:1004–13. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2015.14050652
2. Spitzer RL, Kroenke K, Williams JB. Validation and utility of a self-report
version of PRIME-MD: the PHQprimary care study. Primary care evaluation
of mental disorders. Patient health questionnaire. JAMA J Am Med Assoc.
(1999) 282:1737–44. doi: 10.1001/jama.282.18.1737
3. Hsieh S, Schubert S, Hoon C, Mioshi E, Hodges JR. Validation of the
Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination III in frontotemporal dementia
and Alzheimer’s disease. Dement Geriatr Cogn Disord. (2013) 36:242–
50. doi: 10.1159/000351671
4. Blackwell AD, Sahakian BJ, Vesey R, Semple JM, Robbins TW,
Hodges JR. Detecting dementia: novel neuropsychological markers of
preclinical Alzheimer’s disease. Dement Geriatr Cogn Disord. (2004)
17:42–8. doi: 10.1159/000074081
5. Professional Record Standards Body. PRSB Standards for the Structure and
Content of Health and Care Records. (2018). Available online at: https://
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 18 November 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 578298
Cardinal and Burchell CamCOPS
www.rcplondon.ac.uk/projects/outputs/standards-clinical-structure-and-
content-patient-records (accessed June 27, 2020).
6. Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, Health & Social Care Information
Centre. Standards for the Clinical Structure and Content of Patient Records.
London: Royal College of Physicians (2013).
7. Rayner L, Matcham F, Hutton J, Stringer C, Dobson J, Steer S, et
al. Embedding integrated mental health assessment and management
in general hospital settings: feasibility, acceptability and the prevalence
of common mental disorder. Gen Hosp Psychiatry. (2014) 36:318–
24. doi: 10.1016/j.genhosppsych.2013.12.004
8. UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. Guide to the Methods
of Technology Appraisal 2013. (2013). Available online at: https://www.nice.
org.uk/process/pmg9/chapter/foreword (accessed June 27, 2020).
9. UK National Health Service. NHS Digital Service Manual: NHS Service
Standard: 12. Make New Source Code Open. (2019). Available online at:
https://service-manual.nhs.uk/service-standard/12-make-new-source-
code-open (accessed June 29, 2020).
10. Yackel TR. How the open-source development model can improve
medical software. Stud Health Technol Inform. (2001) 84:68–72.
doi: 10.3233/978-1-60750-928-8-68
11. Leong TY, Kaiser K, Miksch S. Free and open source enabling technologies
for patient-centric, guideline-based clinical decision support: a survey. Yearb
Med Inform. (2007) 16, 74–86. doi: 10.1055/s-0038-1638529
12. Shah J, Rajgor D, Pradhan S, McCready M, Zaveri A, Pietrobon R. Electronic
data capture for registries and clinical trials in orthopaedic surgery:
open source versus commercial systems. Clin Orthop. (2010) 468:2664–
71. doi: 10.1007/s11999-010-1469-3
13. NHS Connecting for Health. NHS Information Governance: Guidelines on
Use of Encryption to Protect Person Identifiable and sensitive information.
(2008). Available online at: https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/
en/archive/20130425190519/https://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/
systemsandservices/infogov/security/encryption.pdf (accessed June 27,
2020).
14. NHS Connecting for Health. IG Toolkit Version 8: Information
Security Assurance Requirement 322: Detailed Guidance on Secure
Transfers. (2010). Available online at: https://web.archive.org/web/
20211026162854/https://docplayer.net/storage/27/10830978/1635269300/
eH88Sxjne7iWx1IlUrbfMA/10830978.pdf (accessed June 27, 2020).
15. NHS Connecting for Health. NHSmail Mobile Configuration Guide: Apple
iPhone London: NHS Connecting for Health (2011).
16. NHS Digital. Approved Cryptographic Algorithms: Good Practice Guideline.
(2016). Available online at: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
ukgwa/20161021125701/https://systems.digital.nhs.uk/infogov/security/
infrasec/gpg/acs.pdf (accessed October 26, 2021).
17. NHS Connecting for Health, British Medical Association. Joint Guidance on
Protecting Electronic Patient Information. (2008). Available online at: https://
datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246 (accessed June 27, 2020).
18. UK. Data Protection Act 2018. (2018). Available online at: https://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/contents/enacted (accessed October 26,
2021).
19. Australian Passport Office. Sex and Gender Diverse Passport Applicants.
(2013). Available online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140912083901/
https://www.passports.gov.au/web/sexgenderapplicants.aspx (accessed
October 26, 2021).
20. Cardinal RN, BurchellM.CamCOPS documentation. (2020). Available online
at: https://camcops.readthedocs.io/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
21. Lewis G, Pelosi AJ, Araya R, Dunn G. Measuring psychiatric disorder in the
community: a standardized assessment for use by lay interviewers. Psychol
Med. (1992) 22:465–86. doi: 10.1017/S0033291700030415
22. Lewis G. Assessing psychiatric disorder with a human interviewer
or a computer. J Epidemiol Community Health. (1994) 48:207–
10. doi: 10.1136/jech.48.2.207
23. Rogers RD, Tunbridge EM, Bhagwagar Z, Drevets WC, Sahakian BJ, Carter
CS. Tryptophan depletion alters the decision-making of healthy volunteers
through altered processing of reward cues. Neuropsychopharmacol. (2003)
28:153–62. doi: 10.1038/sj.npp.1300001
24. R Core Team. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing.
Vienna: R Foundation for Statistical Computing (2019).
25. Hipp DR. SQLite. (2000). Available online at: https://www.sqlite.org/
(accessed October 26, 2021).
26. Cardinal RN. Clinical Records Anonymisation and Text Extraction
(CRATE): an open-source software system. BMC Med Inform Decis Mak.
(2017) 17:50. doi: 10.1186/s12911-017-0437-1
27. Hunt A. The Pragmatic Programmer: From Journeyman to Master. Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley (2000).
28. Salawa P. SQLiteStudio. (2018). Available online at: https://sqlitestudio.pl/
(accessed October 26, 2021).
29. RStudio Team. RStudio: Integrated Development for R. Boston, MA: RStudio,
PBC (2020). Available online at: https://www.rstudio.com/
30. HL7 International. Health Level Seven (HL7) version 2. (2015). Available
online at: https://www.hl7.org/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
31. Harris PA, Taylor R, Thielke R, Payne J, Gonzalez N, Conde JG. Research
electronic data capture (REDCap)–a metadata-driven methodology
and workflow process for providing translational research informatics
support. J Biomed Inform. (2009) 42:377–81. doi: 10.1016/j.jbi.2008.
08.010
32. Burns SS, Browne A, Davis GN, Rimrodt SL, Cutting LE. PyCap
(version 1.0.2). Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University; Childrens Hospital of
Philadelphia (2016). Available online at: https://pycap.readthedocs.io/
33. HL7.org. HL7 FHIR [Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources] Release 4.
(2019). Available online at: https://hl7.org/fhir/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
34. UK. Public Records Act 1958. (1958). Available online at: https://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/6-7/51 (accessed October 26, 2021).
35. UK Department of Health. Records Management: NHS Code of Practice,
Part 1. (2006). Available online at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547055/
Records_Management_-_NHS_Code_of_Practice_Part_1.pdf (accessed
June 27, 2020).
36. UK Department of Health. Records Management: NHS Code of Practice, Part
2 (2nd edition). (2009). Available online at: https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547054/
Records_Management_-_NHS_Code_of_Practice_Part_2_second_edition.
pdf.pdf (accessed June 27, 2020).
37. UK. Data Protection Act 1998. (1998). Available online at: https://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29 (accessed October 26, 2021).
38. Stroustrup B. The C++ Programming Language. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley. (1986).
39. The Qt Company. Qt. (2017). Available online at: https://www.qt.io/
(accessed October 26, 2021).
40. Zetetic, LLC. SQLCipher. (2017). Available online at: https://www.zetetic.net/
sqlcipher/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
41. The OpenSSL Project. OpenSSL Toolkit. (2016). Available online at: https://
www.openssl.org/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
42. Young E. SSLeay. (1998). Available online at: https://www.cryptsoft.com/
(accessed October 26, 2021).
43. van Rossum G. Python Reference Manual. Centrum voor Wiskunde en
Informatica. Amsterdam: Netherlands (1995). Available online at: https://
www.python.org/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
44. The CherryPy Team. CherryPy 18.1.0. (2018). Available online at: https://
cherrypy.org/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
45. Chesneau B. Gunicorn 19.8.1. (2018). Available online at: https://gunicorn.
org/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
46. The Apache Software Foundation. Apache HTTP Server 2.4.20. (2016).
Available online at: https://httpd.apache.org/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
47. Torvalds L. Linux. (1991). Available online at: https://www.linuxfoundation.
org/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
48. Oracle Corporation. MySQL 8.0 Reference Manual. (2020). Available online
at: https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/ (accessed June 27, 2020).
49. MariaDB Foundation. MariaDB Server. (2020). Available online at: https://
mariadb.org/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
50. Bayer M. SQLAlchemy. (2016). Available online at: https://www.sqlalchemy.
org/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
51. Merkel D. Docker: Lightweight Linux Containers for Consistent Development
and Deployment. Linux J. (2014). Available online at: https://www.
linuxjournal.com/content/docker-lightweight-linux-containers-consistent-
development-and-deployment (accessed June 27, 2020).
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 19 November 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 578298
Cardinal and Burchell CamCOPS
52. Cardinal RN, Burchell M. CamCOPS source code. (2020). Available online
at: https://github.com/RudolfCardinal/camcops (accessedOctober 26, 2021).
53. Apple Inc. iOS Developer Program Enterprise License Agreement (2021).
Available online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20211020035029/
https://developer.apple.com/support/downloads/terms/apple-developer-
enterprise-program/Apple-Developer-Enterprise-Program-License-
Agreement-20210607-English.pdf (accessed October 26, 2021).
54. Codd EF. A relational model of data for large shared data banks. Commun
ACM. (1970) 13:377–87. doi: 10.1145/362384.362685
55. Apple Inc. iOS Developer Program License Agreement (2021). Available
online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20211020044325/https://developer.
apple.com/support/downloads/terms/apple-developer-program/Apple-
Developer-Program-License-Agreement-20210607-English.pdf (accessed
October 26, 2021).
56. Provos N, Mazieres D. A future-adaptable password scheme. In: Proceedings
of 1999 USENIX Annual Technical Conference. (2020). p. 81-92. Available
online at: https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/usenix99/provos/provos_
html/node1.html (accessed June 27, 2020).
57. World Health Organization. The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and
Behavioural Disorders: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines
(CDDG). (1992). Available online at: https://www.who.int/entity/
classifications/icd/en/bluebook.pdf (accessed December 7, 2007).
58. World Health Organization, US National Center for Health Statistics, US
Ceters for Medicare and Medicaid Services. International Classification of
Diseases, Ninth Revision, ClinicalModification (ICD-9-CM). (1979). Available
online at: https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/icd/icd9cm.htm (accessed June 10,
2014).
59. Free Software Foundation. GNU General Public License. (2007). Available
online at: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/ (accessed October 26, 2021).
60. Pfizer Inc. PHQ Screeners. (2020). Available online at: https://www.
phqscreeners.com/ (accessed June 29, 2020).
61. Nelson HE. National Adult Reading Test (NART): For the Assessment of
Premorbid Intelligence in Patients with Dementia: Test Manual. Windsor:
NFER-Nelson (1982).
62. Nelson HE.Use of the National Adult Reading Test. Personal communication
to Rudolf Cardinal (May 30, 2013).
63. Bell V, Halligan PW, Ellis HD. The Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions
Scale (CAPS): a new validated measure of anomalous perceptual
experience. Schizophr Bull. (2006) 32:366–77. doi: 10.1093/schbul/
sbj014
64. Beck AT, Ward CH, Mendelson M, Mock J, Erbaugh J. An
inventory for measuring depression. Arch Gen Psychiatry. (1961)
4:561–71. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.1961.01710120031004
65. Cox JL, Holden JM, Sagovsky R. Detection of postnatal depression.
Development of the 10-item Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale. Br J
Psychiatry J Ment Sci. (1987) 150:782–6. doi: 10.1192/bjp.150.6.782
66. Royal College of Psychiatrists. The Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale.
Personal communication to Rudolf Cardinal (August 6, 2013).
67. National Security Agency CNSS Secretariat. National Policy on the Use of the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Protect National Security Systems
and National Security Information. (2003). Available online at: https://csrc.
nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/aes/CNSS15FS.pdf (accessed June 27,
2020).
68. Multiple authors. Are There Actually Any Advantages to Android Full-Disk
Encryption? (2012). Available online at: https://security.stackexchange.com/
questions/10529/are-there-actually-any-advantages-to-android-full-disk-
encryption (accessed March 28, 2014).
69. Google Inc., Open Handset Alliance. Android: Notes on the Implementation
of Encryption in Android 3.0. (2014). Available online at: https://web.
archive.org/web/20140530175700/https://source.android.com/devices/tech/
encryption/android_crypto_implementation.html (accessed June 27, 2020).
70. Mogull R.How to Use Your iPad Securely. (2011). Available online at: https://
www.macworld.com/article/1160313/iPad_security.html (accessed June 27,
2020).
71. Apple Inc. iOS Security. (2012). Available online at: https://web.archive.
org/web/20140405001141/https://www.apple.com/ipad/business/docs/iOS_
Security_Oct12.pdf (accessed June 27, 2020).
72. Google Inc., Open Handset Alliance. Android: System Permissions. (2020).
Available online at: https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/
permissions.html (accessed June 27, 2020).
73. Network Working Group. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2 (RFC 5246). (2008). Available online at: https://tools.ietf.org/
html/rfc5246 (accessed October 26, 2021).
74. Karwin B. SQL Antipatterns: Avoiding the Pitfalls of Database Programming.
Raleigh, NC: Pragmatic Bookshelf (2010).
75. The MITRE Corporation. CWE-384: Session Fixation. (2008). Available
online at: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/384.html (accessed June 27,
2020).
76. Cullen AJ, Mann I. Hacking the human: countering the socially engineered
attack. J Inf Warf. (2008) 7:24–35. Available online at: https://www.jstor.org/
stable/26486865
77. Mann I. Hacking the Human: Social Engineering Techniques and Security
Countermeasures. Aldershot: Gower. (2008).
78. Hipp DR. SQLite: Most Widely Deployed SQL Database. (2014). Available
online at: https://sqlite.org/mostdeployed.html (accessed March 28, 2014).
79. Hipp DR. SQLite: How SQLite Is Tested. (2014). Available online at: https://
www.sqlite.org/testing.html (accessed June 27, 2020).
80. Hipp DR. SQLite: Atomic Commit in SQLite. (2014). Available online at:
https://www.sqlite.org/atomiccommit.html (accessed June 27, 2020).
81. LyuMR. ed.Handbook of Software Reliability Engineering. Los Alamitos, CA:
IEEE Computer Society Press (1996).
82. Nanz S, Furio CA. A comparative study of programming languages in
Rosetta code. ICSE 15 Proc 37th Int Conf Softw Eng. (2015) 1:778–
88. doi: 10.1109/ICSE.2015.90
83. Barrows RC Jr, Clayton PD. Privacy, confidentiality, and
electronic medical records. J Am Med Inform Assoc. (1996)
3:139–48. doi: 10.1136/jamia.1996.96236282
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